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Articles 
FEDERAL FIREARMS PROSECUTIONS: A PRIMER 
By Phillip S. Jackson 
Introduction 
For the past several years, the U.S. Attorney's Of-
fice, in coordination with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms and area police departments, has increas-
ingly pursued in the U.S. District Court the prosecution of 
persons with previous criminal felony convictions found in 
possession offirearms. Until recently, in almost all such 
cases, there was the prospect of greater punishment for 
those convicted in the federal courts of such a crime than 
in the state courts of Maryland. I The purpose of this ar-
ticle is to acquaint the criminal practitioner with a variety 
of salient issues he or she will confront when involved in a 
case where a client faces federal firearm charges. 
The Crime 
In the majority of cases pursued under this federal 
firearms initiative, the primary charge is an alleged viola-
tionof18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I)(2002), colloquially known 
as a "felon in possession" charge.2 That statute reads, "It 
shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted 
in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year, to ... possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition."3 Although pros-
ecutions initiated under this statute usually involve the al-
leged illegal possession of a handgun, note that it is also 
unlawful for a convicted felon to possess firearm ammuni-
tion.4 Indeed, a significant minority offederal firearm pros-
ecutions involved defendants in possession of ammunition 
without a handgun.5 The bail and sentencing provisions 
outlined below apply with equal weight to those charged 
with either unlawful possession of a firearm or illegal pos-
session of ammunition. 6 
To convict a defendant for unlawful possession of a 
firearm by a felon, the government must prove three basic 
elements: (1) that the defendant possessed a firearm or 
ammunition; (2) that prior to his or her possession of that 
weapon or ammunition, the defendant had suffered a dis-
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qualifying criminal conviction; and (3) that the firearm or 
ammunition affected interstate commerce.7 Adefendant 
convicted ofa Section 922(g) violation faces a ten-year 
maximum term of imprisonment, except in those cases 
where because of his or her prior criminal record a defen-
dant is considered an "armed career criminal" as defined 
by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).8,9 The "armed career criminal" 
provisions of Section 924( e) are explored in more detail 
below. 10 
Although the mens rea aspect of this crime requires 
the government to prove defendant knowingly possessed 
a firearm, it is not necessary that the government prove 
defendant knew that his or her possession was unlawful, 
that he or she knew of his or her prior felony conviction, 
or that he or she knew the firearm was somehow involved 
in interstate commerce. I I, 12 
The lion's share oflitigation in these cases center on 
search and seizure issues and the possession element of 
the crime. Whether a particular weapon is a firearm, 
whether a defendant has been previously convicted of a 
disqualifying crime, and whether the firearm or ammuni-
tion affects interstate commerce are not typically points of 
contention at trial. 13 
The definition of "firearm" is found at 18 U.S .C. 
§ 921(a)(3), and includes: 
(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which 
will or is designed to or may readily be converted 
to expel a projectile by the action of an explo-
SIve; 
(B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; 
(C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; and 
(D) any destructive device. 14 
By that definition, the government need not allege or 
prove that the firearm is operable. 15 Antique firearms are 
excluded from the definition of "firearm" and, therefore, 
from application of the criminal statute. 16 "Ammunition" 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. §922(a)(17)(2002), includes 
"cartridge cases, primers, bullets [and] propellant pow-
der designed for use in any firearm. "17 
For the element concerning a defendant's prior crimi-
nal conviction to apply, it is only necessary that the 
defendant's prior criminal conviction subjected him or her 
to a potential penalty of incarceration of more than one 
year. It is immaterial that the actual sentence meted out 
involved no term of imprisonment or a term of imprison-
ment ofless than a year; however, a misdemeanor con-
viction under state law and punishable by less than two 
years incarceration would not disqualify a defendant from 
lawful firearm possession under 18 U .S.C. § 922(g)( 1 ).18. 
19 So, for example, a defendant whose only prior convic-
tion was for a misdemeanor theft in Maryland (a crime 
whose maximum sentence is eighteen months) could not 
be federally prosecuted under Section 922(g)( 1) for un-
lawful possession of a firearm.20 
As it is seldom tactically advantageous to have the 
prior criminal conduct of one's client accentuated at trial, 
this is an element that is typically readily stipulated to by 
defense counsel. When addressed as a stipulation, the 
district court judge should only allow evidence of the fact 
ofthe disqualifying conviction.21 No information about 
the nature or circumstances ofthat conviction should be 
imparted to the jury.22 When linked with an appropriate 
limiting instruction to the jury, the potential prejudicial ef-
fect of the client's prior criminal record can thereby be 
kept to a minimum.23 
With an eye to that legislation, the best course of 
action for a practitioner representing a client charged with 
a Section 922(g) violation may be to request a pre-sen-
tence report very soon after entering the case. The dis-
trict court can, at its discretion, order a pre-sentence re-
port even where a defendant has not yet been convicted 
of the crime with which he or she has been charged. In 
the normal course of investigation, the U.S. Probation Of-
ficers do a very thorough and accurate examination of 
defendant's prior criminal conduct. A pre-sentence in-
vestigation may very well determine that in light ofthe 
above described legislation, your client may not be dis-
qualified from possessing a firearm at all. At worst, the 
preliminary pre-sentence report will more fully inform you 
and your client ofthe potential exposure he or she faces. 
As outlined below, your client's potential length ofincar-
ceration is very much a factor of his or her prior criminal 
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record. 
As to the interstate commerce element, it is sufficient 
that the government shows that the firearm was manufac-
tured outside the state where the defendant possessed it. 24 
This too is an element typically handled for expediency's 
sake by stipulation. Since the Supreme Court's decision 
in United States v. Lopez,25 there have been some rum-
blings that more may be required in the way of a showing 
of a measurable or substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.26 However, in recent decisions the Fourth Circuit 
has declined to read into Lopez, and its progeny, any 
greater burden than that outlined above.27 
The same precepts that govern other crimes having 
a possessory element govern the possession element of a 
Section 922(g)( 1) violation.28 The government need not 
prove the defendant had actual or exclusive possession 
of a firearm; constructive or joint possession is sufficient. 29 
The government may prove constructive possession by 
demonstrating that the defendant exercised, or had the 
power to exercise, dominion and control over the fire-
arm.30 On that basis, the Fourth Circuit upheld the con-
viction of a defendant where the firearm was seized from 
a residence in which the defendant had been observed for 
two days prior to the execution of that warrant although 
he was not present at the time of the warrant's execution 
and in which the defendants personal papers were found 
proximate to the seized firearm.31 Similarly, the court up-
held the conviction where the gun was recovered from the 
defendant's bedroom, and at the time of his arrest, am-
munition of a matching caliber was found in the defendant's 
pocket.32 On the other hand, the court found evidence 
insufficient to sustain a conviction where the firearm had 
been recovered from under the seat ofthe defendant who 
was merely a passenger in an automobile.33 
With respect to joint possession, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed in an unpublished case the firearm conviction of 
the driver of a vehicle who never had actual or exclusive 
possession of a firearm.34 In that matter, a front seat pas-
senger was observed by the police pointing a handgun out 
the car window, but the court was able to infer, based on 
the police chase that followed, that the driver had knowl-
edge ofthe firearm's presence in the car, and had appar-
ently shared in the purpose of the passenger's brandishing 
that weapon.35 
In my legal experience, the "possession" aspect of 
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the crime is the most contested element of a Section 922(g) 
prosecution.36 As a practical matter, it is more a matter of 
advocacy and persuasion as applied to the specific facts 
of the case, than knowledge ofthe legal parameters of 
"possession" that are key to the disposition of these cases. 
Quite often, the firearm in issue is not found in the exclu-
sive possession ofthe defendant, as when a gun is found 
lying in a vehicle full of passengers. Equally often, the 
defendant is not found proximate to the firearm when it is 
seized, as when a gun is found in an empty residence. 
Normally, it will not be the issue of sufficiency of the evi-
dence that determines your client's fate, but rather your 
skill in distancing the client from the seized weapon. 
Affirmative Defenses 
In United States v. Perrin,37 the Fourth Circuit 
joined several other circuits38 in ruling that a defendant 
charged with a Section 922(g) violation has available to 
him or her the claim of self-defense. The court indicated, 
however, it was prepared to recognize that defense in only 
a very narrow range of cases.39 To raise the defense of 
justification or self-defense, a defendant must produce evi-
dence that would allow the fact-finder to conclude: (1) 
the defendant was under an unlawful and present threat of 
death or serious bodily injury; (2) the defendant did not 
recklessly place himself or herself in a situation where he 
would be forced to engage in criminal conduct; (3) the 
defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to both the 
criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm; 
and (4) there was a direct causal relationship between the 
possession ofthe firearm and the avoidance ofthe threat-
ened harm.40 
In its reported decisions on this issue, the Fourth 
Circuit emphasized the threat causing the defendant to arm 
himself must be imminent. In that regard, the court has 
held that even where a defendant's fear of attack may 
have been both rational and his true motivation for carrying 
a firearm, a self-defense jury instruction was not warranted 
in a case where the defendant, in the course ofhis legitimate 
profession, was shot eight months previous to his arrest 
and had, therefore, purchased a firearm in response to 
that earlier attack.41 Moreover, a self-defense jury 
instruction was not warranted in a case where two days 
prior to the arrest, a shotgun-toting enemy stalked the 
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On the other hand, the court endorsed a self-de-
fense jury instruction in those cases where the threat was 
both deadly and immediate. For example, where a de-
fendant without provocation was threatened by a gun-
man, and then wrestled the gun away from his assailant, 
the jury should be properly instructed on self-defense.43 
BaiVDetention 
Once arrested, the issue of pre-trial detention is natu-
raIl y the prime concern of most defendants. In that re-
gard, itis importantto be familiar with 18 U.S.C § 3142 
(2000). I will here endeavor to briefly highlight Section 
3142 's significant provisions as they affect alleged firearm 
violations. Under Section 3142 's statutory scheme, the 
government's ability to seek detention of an arrestee is 
not plenary. Rather, the government can seek detention 
only if the charged conduct is (1) "a crime ofviolence;" 
(2) "an offense for which the maximum sentence is life 
imprisonment or death;" (3) a controlled substance viola-
tion that carries a term often years or more imprisonment; 
or (4) a felonyM and the defendant has been previously 
convicted of any combination of two or more violent crimes 
or narcotics felonies.45 In addition, the government can 
also seek detention if the defendant is a serious flight risk 
or presents a serious risk that he or she will obstruct or 
attempt to obstruct justice. 46 
Because a defendant who finds himself or herself 
charged with a federal handgun violation will typically have 
an extensive criminal record, it is usually on the ground 
that a defendant has two or more prior violent crime and! 
or narcotics felony convictions that the government moves 
for detention. As outlined above, in such cases, Section 
3142 explicitly authorizes the government to move for 
pretrial detention. However, in cases where a defendant 
has only one prior conviction for a violent crime or nar-
cotics felony the law is unsettled as to the government's 
authority to move for detention. In such cases, usually the 
only basis for the government's detention motion would 
be that the Section 922(g) violation constitutes a crime of 
violence. Although it is long settled that for sentencing 
guideline purposes a Section 922(g)(l) violation is not a 
"crime ofviolence,"47 it is unclear whether, for Section 
3142( f) purposes, a felon in possession charge is a "crime 
of violence" that would allow the government to move for 
detention. 
A "crime of violence" includes those felonies that, 
by their nature involve a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used in 
the course of committing the offense. In concrete terms, 
the issue is whether the government can ask for the deten-
tion of a defendant who, while on parole for a violent felony, 
is caught with a loaded firearm on the street in an open-air 
drug market, and then charged with a Section 922(g) vio-
lation. To date, the Fourth Circuit has not addressed this 
issue. Those circuits that have wrestled with this issue 
have come to divergent conclusions.48 Indeed, within this 
district there has been a split. In United States v. Aiken,49 
the court held, as a matter oflaw, a felon in possession 
charge constitutes a "crime of violence" for purposes of 
Section 3142( f), while Judge Chasanow has more recently 
held to the contrary. 50 
In those cases where the government is statutorily 
authorized to move for the pre-trial detention of a defen-
dant, it must convince the presiding magistrate by clear 
and convincing evidence that no condition or combination 
of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the com-
munity.51 In making that decision, the magistrate must 
consider the following factors: 
1. the nature and circumstances of the offense 
charged; 
2. the weight of the evidence against the defendant; 
3. the history and characteristics of the defendant, 
including such things as his or her prior criminal 
record, employment record, ties to the commu-
nity, physical and mental condition, and whether at 
the time of the charged violation the defendant was 
under some form of court supervision; and 
4. the seriousness of the danger to the community 
that would be posed by the defendant's release. 52 
The hearing in which the detention issue is fleshed 
out usually occurs at a time removed from a defendant's 
initial appearance before the magistrate. This delay is typi-
cally occasioned by a request for continuance made by 
either party that must be granted. If the government makes 
the continuance request the detention hearing can be de-
layed for up to three days. If the defendant makes the 
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continuance request the detention hearing can be delayed 
for up to five days. 53 In the interim, an agent of United 
States Pretrial Services will interview the defendant, con-
duct a background investigation, and prepare a report 
addressing the factors that must be weighed by the court 
in making its decision. 
Finally, should either party choose, 18 U.S.C. § 3145 
(2000) provides for review by the district court of a 
magistrate's detention/release determination. Such reviews 
are conducted de novo. 54 
Search and Seizures Issues 
Search and seizures issues confronted by the practi-
tioner in such cases will vary widely. A comprehensive 
treatment ofthose issues in this article is impracticable. 
However, as a general matter, firearm seizures result from 
an on-the-street encounter or a car stop, or a search 
warrant. 
In regard to those firearms seized as the result of the 
execution of a search warrant, the practitioner will want 
to be familiar with Arkansas v. Wilson55 (cases where a 
no-knock entry was made); United States v. Lalor6 (is-
sue as to the nexus between the firearm seized and the 
residence for which the warrant was sought); Illinois v. 
Gates57 (analysis of what comprises "probable cause"); 
United States v. Leon58 (for the metes and bounds ofthe 
"good faith exception"); and Franks v. Delaware59 (in 
those cases where it is suspected the affiant misrepresented 
facts to the issuing magistrate). 
With regard to those firearms seized as the result of 
an on-the-street encounter between the police and your 
client, the practitioner will want to be familiar with Cali-
fornia v. Hodari D.60 (where the defendant discarded 
the drugs during a police chase); United States v. 
Mendenha1l61 (an analysis of the point at which an on-
the-street encounter becomes a detention for Fourth 
Amendment purposes); Terry v. Ohio62 (an analysis of 
what amount of evidence is necessary to briefly detain 
and frisk a suspect); and JL. v. Florida (in those cases 
where the stop was prompted by an anonymous tip). 
In regard to those cases arising from a gun found in a 
car, the practitioner will want to be acquainted with Dela-
ware v. Prouse63 (for a discussion ofthe quantum of evi-
dence needed to justify a warrantless traffic stop); Michi-
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gan v. Longh4 (for a discussion ofthe lawful scope of a 
warrantless search of an automobile made incident to a 
Terry-type stop); Maryland v. Wilson65 (for the propo-
sition that, as part of a lawful traffic stop the police can 
order the occupants of a vehicle to get out of the stopped 
car); New Yorkv. Belton66 (for a discussion of the lawful 
scope of a warrantless search of a car made incident to 
the arrest of a car's occupant); Carroll v. United States67 
and United States v. ROSS68 (for discussions ofthe quan-
tum of evidence needed for and the lawful scope of a war-
rantless search of an automobile). 
Sentencing 
As outlined above, a defendant who does not qualifY 
for enhanced sentencing under 18 U.S.c. § 924( e) faces 
a ten-year maximum term of incarceration. In meting out 
a sentence in such a case, the judge's sentencing options 
are circumscribed by the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines that, unlike Maryland's sentencing guidelines, are not 
merely precatory. 
A pair of numeric scores drives the federal sentenc-
ing guideline scheme. One score involves a defendant's 
prior criminal conduct, and is referred to as the Criminal 
History Category. The crime for which a defendant is 
being sentenced is also accorded a numeric value, and is 
referred to as the Offense Level. Where those two scores 
intersect on the guideline matrix,69 a range of months is 
found. Within that range of months the federal judge must 
sentence a convicted defendant to prison. 
In ascertaining the appropriate offense level for con-
victions of18 U.S. C. § 922(g)(I) violations, United States 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 is the pertinent 
reference point. Generally speaking, if a defendant has 
previously been convicted of any combination of two "con-
trolled substance offenses"7o or "crimes ofviolence,"71 his 
or her offense level is twenty-four. 72 Ifa defendant has 
previously been convicted of only one narcotics or violent 
felony, his or her offense level is twenty.73 There are 
certain offense specific adjustments that could enhance or 
reduce the offense level depending on the circumstances 
of the crime of conviction. As an example, if the firearm at 
issue was stolen or had an obliterated serial number, that 
offense level would be increased two levels.74 Those ad-
justments are outlined in U.S.S.U § 2K2.1(b). 
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For determining a defendant's criminal history cat-
egory, Section 4A.l of the United States Sentencing 
Guideline Commission manual is the relevant guideline. By 
that section, the number of a defendant's previous con-
victions, the length of imprisonment imposed for those 
convictions, and the defendant's status vis-a-vis the criminal 
justice system at the time ofthe crime are all factored in 
determining the defendant's criminal history category. 
As an example, a defendant who, within the past 
two years was convicted of narcotics distribution, received 
a suspended sentence, and who was still on probation at 
the time of the instant Section 922(g) violation, would by 
§ 4A 1.1 's computations have a criminal history category 
of II. Having suffered only one previous conviction for a 
narcotics or violent felony, this hypothetical defendant's 
offense level would be twenty per Section 2Kl.l (a)( 4). 
Assuming this defendant's conviction came as the result 
of a jury trial, his sentencing guideline range would be 37-
46 months of incarceration. Under such circumstances, 
(indeed under almost all circumstances where a defen-
dant has only one prior narcotics or violent felony convic-
tion) a federal sentence would be less than the five-year 
minimum mandatory sentence that would attach to a con-
viction obtained under Maryland's analogous firearms stat-
ute.75 
That would certainly not be the case where a defen-
dant convicted of a Section 922(g)( 1) violation suffered 
three previous convictions of any combination of "violent 
felonies" or "serious drug offenses" committed on occa-
sions different from one another. Under such circum-
stances, notwithstanding the sentencing provisions outlined 
above, per 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (more popularly termed 
the Armed Career Criminal Act or "ACCA"), a defen-
dant faces a minimum mandatory fifteen-year term of im-
prisonment and a maximum life term of incarceration. 76 
The term "serious drug offense" is defined at 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) as any federal narcotics offense 
for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years 
or more; or any state narcotics violation involving the manu-
facture, distribution or possession with intent to distribute 
narcotics for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 
ten years or more. By that definition, a conviction for 
simple possession of narcotics would not be a "serious 
drug offense," and would, therefore, not count as a predi-
cate conviction for ACCA purposes. Under Maryland 
law, the maximum sentence for distribution of marijuana is 
only five years77; therefore, a conviction for the distribu-
tion, manufacture, or possession with intent to distribute 
marijuana similarly would not be a "serious drug offense." 
In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 924( e )(2)(B) defines 
"violent felony" as "any crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year ... that -- (i) has as 
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is bur-
glary, arson or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another." In other words, a 
crime will be classified, as a ''violent felony" ifit is specifi-
cally so designated, e.g. a burglary has an element involv-
ing the use of force, e.g. a murder or robbery,78 or its 
commission, involves a serious risk of injury to others. 
In Taylor v. United States 79, the Court wrestled with 
the issue of how a sentencing court should approach a 
defendant's prior criminal record in determining what quali-
fies as a "violent felony" conviction, where the prior con-
viction is not explicitly so stamped by Section 
924(e)(2)(B). Choosing from among alternative ap-
proaches, the Court adopted a "categorical approach," in 
which weighing a defendant's prior record, the sentencing 
court is required generally "to look only to the fact of con-
viction and statutory definition of the prior offense." 80 
Note that although Taylor usually restricts the dis-
trict court's inquiry to ascertaining the statutory definition 
ofthe prior offense, the Court also recognized that "[ t ]his 
categorical approach ... may permit the sentencing court 
to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range 
of cases .... "81 On that language, in United States v. 
CooJc82, the court held where a crime may be committed 
by both violent and nonviolent means, ''the sentencing court 
must examine the charging papers and the jury instruc-
tions" to determine whether the crime for which the de-
fendant was convicted was done by violent means. 
On paper this process sounds simple and straight-
forward. In practice these determinations have spawned 
manifold and wide-ranging appellate decisions. Because 
the various states have disparate definitions for similarly 
titled crimes, even those crimes explicitly designated in 
the ACCA as "violent felonies" are often the subject of 
heated appeals. As just one example, before Maryland 
re-codified its breaking and entering statutes in 1994, ''bur-
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glary" was defined as "the breaking and entering of the 
dwelling house of another in the nighttime with the intent 
to commit a felony. "83 In Missouri, however, a burglary 
conviction could result from the unlawful entering of a build-
ing for the purpose of committing a crime therein84 irre-
spective of whether the building entered was a dwelling, 
the entry occurred at night, or the crime intended was a 
felony or misdemeanor. In having to choose from a host 
of possible definitions, federal courts were, therefore, 
faced with the difficult task of determining what consti-
tutes a burglary for Section 924( e )(2)(B). 
In addressing this dilemma, the TaylorB5 Court con-
cluded Congress did not have intend the crime of "bur-
glary" to have a variety of meanings varying the impact of 
prior convictions for like crimes depending on the state 
where a defendant's prior convictions occurred. Instead, 
the Court reasoned "Congress meant by 'burglary' the 
generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal 
codes of most States ... , [a crime which] contains at least 
the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry 
into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with 
intent to commit a crime. "86 Thus, what under Maryland 
law had historically been deemed a "storehouse break-
ing" would for Section 924( e) purposes be considered a 
''burglary.''87 
Even more problematic is discerning the effect of prior 
convictions for crimes not explicitly categorized as "vio-
lent felonies," defined as those crimes involving a serious 
risk of injury to others. Although not having an element 
the intentional application of force, such crimes as escape88 
and involuntary manslaughter9 have been construed as 
"violent felonies" because their commission in all cases 
involves a serious potential risk of physical injury. There 
are other crimes where the commission involves a signifi-
cant risk of injury to others (e.g., resisting arrest90 and 
possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking 
crime ),91 which perhaps could perhaps serve as predicate 
crimes under the ACCA and which undoubtedly the ap-
pellate courts will be asked to construe in the future. 
Where the prior conviction was for a crime that can 
be committed by either violent or non-violent means, the 
sentencing court may consider the charging document un-
derlying that prior conviction, the instructions made to the 
jury at the trial of that crime92 and the pre-sentence re-
ports prepared as an aid for sentencing that prior convic-
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tion.93 In United States v. Coleman, the issue was 
whether a previous common-law assault conviction should 
count as a "violent felony" conviction. A common law 
assault may encompass some conduct that does not in-
volve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physi-
cal force.94 In determining whether that prior assault con-
viction was a ''violent felony" for Section 924( e) purposes, 
the district court properly referred to the probable cause 
statement that accompanied the statement of charges. The 
probable cause statement indicated, that in the course of 
the alleged assault Coleman pointed a gun at a police of-
ficer. On this basis, the circuit court concluded that 
Coleman's prior assault conviction was properly catego-
rized as a "violent felony." 
Often the pre-sentence report will note several pre-
vious convictions that share a common sentencing date. 
For instance, if the police arrest a burglar who is subse-
quently charged with multiple burglaries that occurred over 
the course of a month, the burglar may end up pleading, 
and being sentenced to a number of burglaries at one time. 
Under such circumstances, the issue becomes whether 
those prior offenses were "committed on occasions dif-
ferent from one another." If treated as having been com-
mitted on separate occasions, each burglary charge would 
be separately counted as a qualifying conviction for Sec-
tion 924( e) purposes. If not, the convictions would count 
collectively as only one prior conviction, and a significantly 
different sentence would be meted out. Convictions oc-
cur "on occasions different from one another" if each of 
the prior convictions arose out of a separate and distinct 
criminal episode.95 Courts have applied a variety offac-
tors to determine whether multiple convictions constitute 
separate and distinct criminal episodes, including whether 
the offenses arose in different geographic locations, whether 
the natures of the offenses were substantially different and 
whether the offenses involved different victims and differ-
ent criminal objectives.96 In the above scenario, the bur-
glar who in a single court proceeding had been convicted 
and sentenced for multiple burglaries would likely be treated 
as an armed career criminal and would face a minimum 
mandatory fifteen-year term ofimprisonment. 
The ability of counsel to attack the viability of those 
prior convictions is sharply circumscribed. In a case where 
the defendant sought to have the sentencing court review 
his previous convictions on the grounds that he was inef-
33.1 U. BaIt L.F. 8 
fectively represented by counsel, the Supreme Court held 
with the sole exception ofthose prior convictions where 
the court failed to appoint counsel for the defendant, the 
defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding has no right 
to collaterally attack his previous convictions at his sen-
tencing for a federal firearm violation.97 
Finally, once it is determined that a defendant is sub-
ject to the provisions of the ACCA, the pertinent sen-
tencing guideline is found in Section 4B 1.4 ofthe United 
States Sentencing Guideline Manual. Under Section 
4B 1.4, a defendant's criminal history category will never 
be lower that Category IV,98 and a defendant's offense 
level will never be lower than thirty-three.99 Therefore, 
the lowest sentencing guideline range for an ACCA-quali-
fied defendant convicted at trial of a Section 922(g)(1) 
violation is from 188 to 235 months. 
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